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The United States Tax Court-Should Discovery
be Expanded?
WILLIAM H. NEWTON HI*
This article examines the methods and scope of discovery
available to the taxpayer involved in tax litigation in the Tax
Court, the Court of Claims and the federal district courts. After
finding that discovery in the Tax Court is significantly more re-
stricted than in the other two available forums, the author re-
views the results of a recent survey of tax practitioners' views of
discovery in that court and concludes that expansion is
necessary.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"The law seldom decides the issue, the facts do; and as con-
trasted with the ascertainment of the facts, the law is relatively
easy to discover."'
In theory, a taxpayer has a choice of three forums in which to
contest his tax liability-the United States Tax Court, the Court of
Claims, or the federal district courts.' The Court of Claims and the
M.S., Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D., Southern Methodist University.
Associate in the firm of Blackwell, Walker, Gray, Powers, Flick & Hoehl, Miami, Florida.
Member of the Florida, Texas and Mississippi Bars. Formerly attorney with Regional Counsel
of the Internal Revenue Service, Miami, Florida.
1. L. STRYKER, THE ART OF ADVOCACY 11 (1954).
2. Jones, Choice of Forum in Tax Litigation Revisited, 35 N.Y.U. INsT. FED. TAX. 373,
381 (1977); Keir & Argue, Choosing a Forum for Tax Litigation, 22 PRAC. LAw. 63, 63 (Oct.
15, 1976); Comment, Discovery in Tax Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 21 U.C.L.A. L. Rsv.
1339, 1340 (1974).
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district courts require payment of the tax deficiency3 as a prerequis-
ite to contesting liability.' Only in the Tax Court does the taxpayer
have the right to defend on the merits without first having to pay.5
This pragmatic economic consideration undoubtedly accounts in
large part for the fact that the caseload in Tax Court is more than
twice that of the combined total of tax cases in the other two avail-
able forums.'
One of the primary distinctions between proceedings in the Tax
Court and in the Court of Claims or the district courts is the extent
of discovery available.7 Discovery in the Tax Court is much more
limited.' Taxpayers unable to pay the deficiency and in need of
The Tax Court is an article I legislative court. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; 26 U.S.C.A. §
7441 (West Supp. 1978). The Court of Claims and the federal district courts are article I
constitutional courts. See U.S. CONST. art. m, § 3. From a jurisdictional viewpoint, the
principal distinction between article I and article III courts is that the former exercise a
limited statutory jurisdiction, while the latter exercise the broad judicial power authorized
under the Constitution. The Tax Court exercises judicial power, but only as to matters
expressly mandated by congressional statute. See, e.g., Burns, Stix, Friedman & Co. v.
Commissioner, 57 T.C. 392, 396 (1971).
The existence of three separate forums for tax disputes has also given rise to substantial
problems on the appellate level. Uncertainty concerning substantive tax law has resulted
from the fact that each court of appeals may adopt an interpretation or rule of law different
from or in direct conflict with another. This uncertainty is rarely resolved by the relatively
few cases which reach the Supreme Court. See Miller, A Court of Tax Appeals Revisited, 85
YALu L.J. 228 passim (1975) (discussing problems and proposing solutions).
3. See 26 U.S.C. § 6211 (Supp. V 1975); Tress. Reg. § 301.6211-1(a) (1977) (defining
"deficiency" as the amount by which tax imposed by statute exceeds tax shown on the
taxpayer's return).
4. As a prerequisite to filing suit in the Court of Claims or the district courts, the
taxpayer must pay the full amount of the tax deficiency. See, e.g., Flora v. United States,
362 U.S. 145, 148 (1960).
5. The Tax Court provides the taxpayer with the alternative of paying nothing until 90
days after entry of the court's decision or, if an appeal to the appropriate United States Court
of Appeals is made, after all appeals have been exhausted. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6213(a), 7481,
7483 (Supp. V 1975).
6. Cohen, Litigation Techniques that Increase Your Chances of Success in Tax Court,
35 J. TAx. 340, 340 (1971). Approximately 85% of all tax litigation in recent years has been
in the Tax Court. Comment, supra note 2, at 1341 n.10.
In this day of easy credit a "no payment required" type of forum has a special
appeal to litigating taxpayers. Small wonder that the Tax Court is doing substan-
tially more federal income tax business-to say nothing of estate and gift tax
cases-than all the federal district courts and the Court of Claims combined.
Furthermore, if a client is stone-broke or not liquid, the Tax Court is the only
place for him.
Keir & Argue, supra note 2, at 63.
7. Numerous commentators have identified the distinctions in discovery as a basis for
forum shopping. See, e.g., Crampton, 31 TAx LAw. 321, 326-27 (1978); Jones, supra note 2,
at 378; Keir & Argue, supra note 2, at 65-66. See also, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Study of the
Trial Court System for Federal Tax Disputes, 22 TAx LAw. 95, 105-10 (1968) (proposing
alternatives to preclude forum shopping in tax litigation) [hereinafter cited as Dep't of
Justice Study].




discovery may rightfully argue that this is unfair, especially since
their opponent in the Tax Court, the Commissioner of the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS"), has the opportunity through the sum-
mons and investigative powers of the government to obtain disclo-
sure of information by means unavailable to taxpayers.' Further-
more, the limits imposed on discovery in the Tax Court increase the
prospects of unfair surprise and tend to perpetuate the common law
"sporting theory of justice."10
It is the purpose of this article: (1) to examine the function of
discovery; (2) to analyze and compare rules of discovery in the Tax
Court with those in the Court of Claims and the district courts,
especially as the discovery rules in the latter forums relate to tax
litigation; and (3) to make proposals, based on the results of a recent
survey of tax practitioners, for reforming deficiencies found to exist.
II. THE FUNCTION OF DISCOVERY
At common law, discovery was unavailable either in civil or
criminal cases." Common law courts relied on detailed factual
pleadings or "forms of action."" Since the pleadings, in theory, were
to provide the necessary factual development, 3 courts were uncon-
cerned with whether opposing counsel was able to review all avail-
able facts prior to trial." The effect of this procedure was to under-
cut principles of fairness and justice; trial was a battle of wits be-
tween opposing counsel." This common law approach has been de-
9. The Commissioner has liberal investigative powers to determine the correctness of any
return. I.R.C. § 7602. These powers include the authority to examine any books, papers or
other records, whether in the hands of the taxpayer or third parties. In addition, they -include
the right to compel testimony under oath. See notes 131-33 and accompanying text infra.
10. Tiedman v. American Pigment Corp., 253 F.2d 803, 808 (4th Cir. 1958) (pointing out
that trial is not a "sporting event" and that discovery is founded upon the policy of promoting
search for truth). See note 16 and accompanying text infra.
11. At common law, the theory was that no man was bound to furnish evidence which
could be used against him by his adversary. See J. FLEMING & G. HAZARD, CiviL PROCEDURE
171-75 (2d ed. 1977). Discovery by a bill in equity was the only means by which a party could
obtain evidence under the control of his adversary. Id. at 171. The process was time-
consuming, costly and difficult. See Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 241 F. 964,
967 (2d Cir. 1917).
12. Pretrial procedure focused entirely on elaborate rules of pleading which rarely en-
sured that the allegations and denials of the parties were even founded in fact. See Sunder-
land, The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure, 36 MICH. L. REv. 215, 215-16 (1937)
[hereinafter cited as Theory & Practice]. See generally R. POUND, READINGS ON THE HISTORY
AND SYSTEMS OF THE COMMON LAw 364-99 (2d ed. 1921); Sunderland, The English Struggle
for Procedural Reform, 39 HAav. L. Rav. 725, 727-38 (1926).
13. See, e.g., Theory & Practice, supra note 12, at 215-16.
14. Pike & Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery -Procedure: 1, 38 COLUM. L.
REv. 1179, 1180 (1938) (pointing out that both sides were to conduct their operations with as
much "secrecy as possible").
15. See, e.g., Theory & Practice, supra note 12, at 215. This common law approach
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nominated the "sporting theory of justice."'"
Demands for justice and fairness in litigation slowly eroded the
common law approach. The concept of fact-revelation through
pleadings was discarded; the pleadings were simply to provide no-
tice of an alleged cause of action. 7 Most forums have rejected out-
right the "sporting theory of justice."'" In general, trials are no
longer conducted in the dark with the case being decided not on the
merits but on the tactical skill of counsel.'" The adoption of a liberal
scope of discovery was intended to "make a trial less a game of blind
man's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues disclosed
to the fullest practicable extent."2 0 Discovery was also intended as
a curative device to correct the imbalance between powerful and less
powerful litigants.2 If one party lacked the physical or financial
resources required to undertake an intensive investigative effort,
that party could, through discovery, prevent his adversary from
bottling up available evidence.2
The thrust of discovery, in line with the objective of promoting
fairness and justice for all litigants, is to attain disclosure of all
relevant evidence prior to trial, making all facts available for careful
study and examination by both sides.23 This is accomplished by
apparently had its roots in the medieval concept of "trial by battle." See Pike & Willis, supra
note 14, at 1180. Since surprise was a legitimate trial tactic, the decision often turned on the
skill and strategy of counsel rather than on the merits.
16. See, e.g., Martin v. Reynolds Metal Corp., 297 F.2d 49, 56 (9th Cir. 1961); Tiedman
v. American Pigment Corp., 253 F.2d 803, 808 (4th Cir. 1958). See also Holtzoff, Instruments
of Discovery under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 MICH. L. REv. 205, 224 (1942).
17. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947). See also G. RAGLAND, Discov-
ERY BEFORE TRIAL 1-18 (1932).
18. Although, traditionally, discovery in criminal trials was more limited than in civil
litigation, recent years have brought more liberalized discovery, even in the area of criminal
law. For a discussion of this trend, see Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event
or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. L. Q. 279, 290.
19. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The Court stated that the pretrial
deposition and discovery mechanisms provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when
applied in a manner consistent with recognized privileges, make available the fullest possible
knowledge of the issues and the facts by all parties before the trial. Id. at 500-01.
20. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
21. See generally Pike & Willis, supra note 14, at 1180. The authors emphasized that at
common law, the character of ammunition and strategy contemplated were "regarded as the
exclusive possession of the party able to possess and devise such materials," with the bar
viewing suspiciously "any attempts to destroy this secrecy just as jingoists view with susup-
cion disarmament conferences." Id.
22. This inbalance and the need for a curative device become readily apparent in the
Tax Court when the Commissioner's vast array of investigative powers is weighed against the
rather meager discovery techniques available to the taxpayer. See note 9 supra.
23. Discovery is said to have three distinct purposes and uses: (1) to narrow the issues
so that trial is required only on those issues which remain controverted; (2) to obtain evidence
for trial; and (3) to secure information concerning the location and existence of discoverable
evidence. See Berry v. Haynes, 41 F.R.D. 243, 244 (S.D. Fla. 1966); Broadway & Ninety-Sixth
JVol. 33:611
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permitting the discovery of evidence admissible at trial and of all
information reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of such
evidence.2" A party is able to probe into areas which may allow him
to secure information concerning the location and existence of ad-
missible evidence. 5 In effect, discovery allows each party great lati-
tude to uncover and examine his opponent's case. As a result, settle-
ments are encouraged and facilitated since counsel for both parties
are able to evaluate their respective positions well in advance of
trial.
When the facts reveal a gray area in the law and litigation is
required, full disclosure prevents unfair surprise at trial and ensures
that the decision of the court accurately reflects the true state of the
facts rather than strictly the skill and expertise of trial counsel. An
expansive scope of discovery, then, is essential to promote fairness,
justice and judicial economy. These goals are accomplished by plac-
ing before the court and the parties all relevant facts well in
advance of trial.2"
St. Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 21 F.R.D. 347, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Ricket v. Hayes, 473
S.W.2d 446, 448 (Ark. 1971); J. FLEMINo & G. HAZAR, supra note 11, at 176-77.
24. FEz. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). This rule provides:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is rele-
vant to the subject matter involved in the pending action. . . . It is not ground
for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.
Id.
Similar provisions regarding the scope of discovery are contained in the rules of practice
and procedure of both the Court of Claims and the Tax Court. See notes 74-75 & 100 infra.
Of course, a broad scope of discovery is of itself ineffective where available discovery tech-
niques are restricted.
25. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507-08 (1947); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). The
Advisory Committee Note to the 1948 amendment of this rule stated:
[Tihe broad scope of examination . . . may cover not only evidence for use at
the trial but also inquiry into matters in themselves inadmissible as evidence but
which will lead to the discovery of such evidence. The purpose of discovery is to
allow a broad search for facts, the names of witnesses, or any other matters which
may aid a party in the preparation or presentation of his case.
Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the
United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 454 (1946).
26. Discovery, in tax litigation as well as in other cases, allows the parties to
learn prior to trial the facts surrounding the cause of action. It rejects the sporting
theory of justice in favor of full disclosure and minimizes the possibility that the
parties will be surprised at trial by the introduction of fresh evidence. In addition,
discovery tends to reduce the time and expense required for trial, not only because
it may lessen the need for adducing testimony in court in those cases that are
tried, but also because it aids in the settlement rather than trial of cases by
bringing out the facts of the cause of action at an early stage in the proceedings.
Dep't of Justice Study, supra note 7, at 105.
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1IX. ANALYSIS OF CONVENTIONAL DISCOVERY TECHNIQUES
Discovery rules in most forums provide for depositions, written
interrogatories, requests for production of documents and admis-
sions. Of these techniques, depositions are the most commonly used
and are considered the most indispensible.17 The special value of
oral depositions, as contrasted with written interrogatories, is read-
ily apparent. The attorney has maximum flexibility and can alter
his line of ifiquiry depending upon the information he receives.
When, as a result of a particular line of questioning, new issues are
developed, they can be explored immediately. In addition, since
both the opposing party and his attorney are present, counsel can
judge their credibility and cooperativeness.
Depositions also provide the spontaneity necessary for gauging
the probable behavior of a witness at trial. This is particularly true
since, unlike written interrogatories, there is no opportunity to avoid
the thrust of a question by consulting one's attorney to frame an
evasive response. Since each attorney is, in effect, provided a pre-
view of the case prior to trial, both are in a better position to judge
the settlement value of the case. In addition, oral depositions max-
imize effective use of the time of the parties, their attorneys and the
court.
In contrast, empirical studies demonstrate that written interro-
gatories are a principal source of tension in discovery. They are
widely criticized and have been involved in many disputes before
the courts. 8 More protective orders and motions to compel are
sought with respect to interrogatories than any other discovery de-
vice." In forums which have adopted broad discovery, restrictions
on the use of interrogatories have been frequently suggested." The
reasons for resistance to interrogatories are readily apparent.3 Un-
27. Statistical studies have domonstrated that oral depositiong are used more often than
other discovery devices. See W. GLASER, PIrTuAJ DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 52
(1968).
28. See, e.g., Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J.
1132, 1144 (1951); Note, Discovery: Boon or Burden?, 36 MINN. L. REv. 364, 377-79 (1952).
29. See, e.g., Weinstein, Standing Masters to Supervise Discovery in the Southern Dis-
trict, New York, 23 F.R.D. 36, 38 (1959).
30. See W. GLASER, supra note 27, at 149; Rall, Proposed Revision of Supreme Court
Rules on Civil Discovery, 46 Cm. B. Rac. 257, 258-59 (1965).
31. See Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HAav. L. Rxv. 940, 959-65 (1961). The
author noted that while interrogatories have proven useful in many respects, they are also
subject to three distinct problems. First, because they are inexpensive and require no prior
court approval, they are often used unnecessarily to harass, especially where a considerable
burden of research and expense may be imposed on the answering party. Second, a problem
arises in connection with the continuing duty under FED. R. Ctv. P. 33 to ensure the truthful-
ness of responses up to the date of trial. Often a witness or evidence is discovered after the
party has responded to the interrogatories. Third, since litigants have proven so resourceful
[Vol. 33:611
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like depositions, which can be used as evidence only under special
circumstances, responses to interrogatories can be used as admis-
sions since they come from parties and are given under oath.32 Ac-
cordingly, there is little motivation to be helpful and a strong pro-
clivity to provide evasive responses tailored by the attorney for the
party to whom the interrogatories are propounded."
While objections to written interrogatories are often raised,
motions to compel responses are even more common. The reason
appears to be that, because of the significant amount of time re-
quired to respond properly, interrogatories can be effectively used
for harassment. As a result, more recipients of allegedly objectiona-
ble interrogatories simply fail to respond or respond evasively than
file objections. The proponent, then, bears the burden of compelling
a proper response with attendant inconvenience and delay.
Requests for production of documents have proven to be of
great value.5 Their purpose is to make available documents or other
evidence in the possession of the opposing party, thus eliminating
unfair surprise. An empirical study has demonstrated that in the
federal district courts, requests for production are used in thirty-one
percent of all cases.3" In contrast, requests for admissions have
proven rather ineffective." They are used infrequently, and the re-
sponses tend to be evasive when they are used.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING THE DISCOVERY PROVISIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT
For fifty years, from 1924 to 1974, no provision for discovery was
made in the rules of practice and procedure of the Tax Court.3"
Instead of establishing a procedure for obtaining full disclosure of
the facts prior to trial, the court relied upon the sense of equity and
fairness of opposing counsel to lead to voluntary stipulation of all
at evading answers or objecting to interrogatories, a considerable burden has been placed
upon the courts because of the time devoted to motions to compel, motions for protective
orders and the filing of objections. The author made several suggestions for alternatives to
the current procedures which could serve to reduce these problems without eliminating the
valid purposes served by and the usefulness of interrogatories.
32. See, e.g., Reese v. Pennsylvania R.R., 14 F.R.D. 153 (N.D. Pa. 1953); Holtzoff, A
Judge Looks at the Rules after Fifteen Years of Use, 15 F.R.D. 155, 165 (1954).
33. The defects in interrogatories were an underlying cause for the introduction of oral
depositions into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Sunderland, Scope and Methods of
Discovery Before Trial, 42 YAL L.J. 863, 875-76 (1933).
34, W. GiAsER, supra note 27, at 147, table 35.
35. Id. at 63.
36. Id. at 53, table 1.
37. Id. at 211.
38. See Drennen, New Rules of Practice and Procedure of the United States Tax Court:
How Are They Working? 27 U. FLA. L. Rav. 897, 897 (1975).
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relevant facts to the fullest practicable extent. 9 Theoretically, this
approach should work well, as it is premised on the admirable goals
of genuine cooperation and free and fair production of relevant facts
prior to trial. Realistically, however, the stipulation procedure al-
lows counsel absolute discretion over the facts within his control and
places him in the conflicting roles of his client's advocate and the
government's advisor. 40 Furthermore, as an advocate, his inclination
would be to adhere to the now objectionable "sporting theory of
justice."
Facts, to be incorporated into a stipulation, must first be pro-
duced." Without an adequate means of discovery, those facts may
never be produced; at best, voluntary production may be made at
a time which will generate unfair surprise. The absence of full dis-
covery provides the opportunity to obtain unfair advantage either
through the total absence of production of relevant and material
facts or through delayed production until shortly before trial, in an
effort to force a better settlement, or during trial in an effort to
influence directly the court's decision. 2 Delaying production until
shortly before trial creates serious problems with verification and
39. Former T. Ct. R. 31(b)(1). Former Tax Court Rule 31(b)(5) provided the only remedy
for failure to stipulate. The procedure was, however, both cumbersome and of limited use.
See Cohen, supra note 6, at 342. Certainly, where a party was unaware of the existence of
facts under the control of his opponent, a motion under Rule 31(b)(5) would never have been
considered.
40. In his role as an advocate, "a lawyer should represent a client zealously within the
bounds of the law." ABA CANoNS O PitOFESIONAL EmicS No. 7. Furthermore,
[in practice before the Internal Revenue Service, which is itself an adversary
party rather than a judicial tribunal, the lawyer is under a duty not to mislead
the Service either by misstatement, silence or through his client, but he is under
no duty to disclose the weaknesses in his client's case.
Id. at No. 314. It has been argued that this provision does not impose a duty to disclose facts.
See Saltzman, Ethical Rules of Conduct for Tax Practitioners: Where Do We Now Stand?
41 J. TAx. 162, 164 (1974).
The conflicting nature of the dual roles was expressed by Justice Frankfurter: "The
function of an advocate is not to enlarge the intellectual horizon. His task is to seduce, to
seize the mind for a predetermined end, not to explore paths for truths." F. FRANKFURrSR,
OF LAw AND MzN (1956).
41. In light of counsel's responsibility to his client, it is inappropriate to conclude that
he would, or even should, voluntarily produce and freely stipulate all facts even to the
detriment of his client's interests. See Cohen, supra note 6, at 340; note 40 supra.
The tactical advantage gained by withholding relevant facts could well influence the
outcome of the trial. Nonproduction could have a significant impact where there are relevant
but undisclosed rebuttal facts which would effectively refute the facts generating the unfair
surprise, and where opposing counsel, though he has access to all other relevant facts, lacks
the necessary trial expertise to regroup and use those facts to meet the unfair surprise. The
failure to disclose facts does not violate any ethical rule provided the opposing party is not
mislead thereby. See Saltzman, supra note 40, at 162.
42. A liberal approach to discovery, however, would encourage zealous representation of
a client's interests since aggressiveness through the use of such discovery would be rewarded
by thorough factual development. See notes 40-41 supra.
[Vol. 33:611
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with obtaining what would otherwise be available rebuttal evi-
dence.' 3 Perhaps the greatest weakness of the stipulation procedure
lies in its effect on testimonial evidence. Without adequate discov-
ery, there is no procedure for determining the nature of a witness'
testimony or gauging his credibility prior to trial."
As a result, the absence of discovery in the Tax Court served
to discourage settlements and to enhance the prospect of obtaining
unfair advantage at trial through nondisclosure. If the facts generat-
ing the surprise were obtainable through discovery, a timely oppor-
tunity would be presented to judge the merit of prospective settle-
ments, to determine whether the facts presented were accurate and
correct, to locate any available rebuttal evidence and to prepare
adequately for trial. It was precisely these considerations which led
to rejection of the "sporting theory of justice" and the adoption of
broad discovery provisions such as those contained in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.'"
In 1974, the Tax Court took a step toward the elimination of
the common law approach by adopting new rules of practice and
procedure which provide limited discovery in the form of written
interrogatories' 7 and requests for production of documents.'8 The
new rules also provide for requests for admissions, which the court
has characterized not as discovery but as an aid in trial prepara-
tion.'" The court cautiously took this limited step, and, while it
43. The difficulty of obtaining a continuance, even where the grounds are apparently
justifiable, adds to this problem. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 522 F.2d 1229, 1232-33 (6th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1072 (1976) (denial of continuance reversed only where clear
abuse of discretion is shown.
44. Although counsel for each side can attempt to contact witnesses informally to discuss
the case with them, there is no alternative available if witnesses prove uncooperative. Nor is
there any method of pinning a witness down and binding him to his story. Consequently, even
if a witness were agreeable to a pretrial interview, there would be nothing to preclude him
from changing his testimony at trial. The prospect of such surprise can be greatly reduced if
a witness' testimony has been previously recorded under oath.
45. See notes 11-24 and accompanying text supra.
46. I.R.C. § 7453 provides that the Tax Court shall have authority to prescribe rules of
practice and procedure governing its proceedings. Part of the impetus for the Tax Court's
adoption of discovery was probably the debate generated at the 1962 meeting of the ABA
Section of Taxation, regarding a proposal that federal district courts be given concurrent
jurisdiction with the Tax Court, such that taxpayers would have two forums in which pay-
ment of the tax was not required. See Drennen, supra note 38, at 897-98. The proposal
stemmed in part from the fact that the rules of the Tax Court contained no provision for
discovery. Id. See also Proposed Rules of the Tax Court, A Panel Discussion Sponsored by
the Section of Taxation, 26 TAx lAw. 377, 378 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Rules].
47. U.S.T.C. R. Paac. & Po. 71.
48. Id. R. 72.
49. Id. R. 90. The note to Rule 90 indicates that requests for admissions are principally
a means of establishing matters which are not disputed. This distinction was articulated by
Judge Raum of the United States Tax Court:
1979]
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sought to parallel the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as closely as
possible, it was reluctant to reach their full scope. The court feared
that discovery would become a substitute for the stipulation proce-
dure and that the court's dockets and judges would become mired
in proceedings to administer and enforce discovery.k Primary reli-
ance for obtaining the facts was to be placed on the stipulation
procedure, and if the discovery rules were abused, the court would
consider their elimination from the rules of practice.5'
V. COMPARISON OF DISCOVERY IN THE TAx COURT WITH DISCOVERY IN
THE COURT OF CLAIMS AND THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
A. Discovery in the Tax Court
The new Tax Court rules reject the detailed fact pleading re-
quired at common law. The rules expressly provide that no technical
forms of pleadings are required and that the pleadings shall give the
parties and the court "fair notice" of the matters in controversy."
Despite rejection of the common law approach to pleading, the Tax
Court has failed to provide for discovery to the extent required for
full development of the facts and for the elimination of unfair sur-
prise.
The rules of the court provide that the parties cannot initiate
discovery until after they have failed to attain their objectives
through informal consultation.5" In Branerton Corp. v.
Commissioner,5" the court concluded that the petitioner failed to
satisfy this requirement because he initiated discovery prior to any
And note, if you please, the essential difference between discovery on the one
hand and request for admission on the other. Both appear to be superficially
similar but they are markedly different. In discovery, you don't know the
answer or are unsure. You are seeking information. By contrast, in the case of a
request for admission, you know the answer, and what you are seeking to do is to
nail it down for the purposes of the case.
Proposed Rules, supra note 46, at 382.
From a procedural perspective, the only distinction between admissions and written
interrogatories and requests for documents is the absence of the requirement of informal
consultation as to the former. See Pearsall v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 94 (1974). The timing
requirements for commencement and conclusion of discovery remain applicable to admis-
sions. See U.S.T.C. R. PRAc. & Po. 70(a)(2).
50. See Drennan, supra note 38, at 899.
51. Id.
52. U.S.T.C. R. PRAc. & PRo. 31(a). In view of the emphasis which the court deems
should be placed on notice pleading it has correspondingly deemphasized motions for more
definite statements under Rule 51. For example, in Ryskiewicz v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 83
(1974), the court denied the petitioner's motion for a more definite statement with respect to
respondent's fraud allegations in its answer, concluding that while more information might
be appropriate, the pleadings met the fair notice requirements of the rules.
53. U.S.T.C. R. PRAc. & Po. 70(a)(1).
54. 61 T.C. 691 (1974).
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informal conferences for the exchange of information or stipulation
of facts. The court granted the government's motion for a protective
order.55 Subsequently, in International Air Conditioning Corp. v.
Commissioner,5 the court held that classifying a request for infor-
mation as "informal" and offering to receive the information in
person failed to satisfy the spirit of the consultation requirement.
Instead, the court determined that "discussion, deliberation, and an
interchange of ideas, thoughts, and opinions between the parties"
was required. 7
Thus, before any discovery may be initiated in the Tax Court,
the parties must either schedule or hold a settlement conference. s
While the informal exchange of information should be encouraged,
there should be no such fixed requirement, especially in situations
where it is already apparent that opposing counsel will prove un-
cooperative. The common law experience with the "sporting theory
of justice" evidences that where delayed production will be detri-
mental to an opponent's case, information will seldom be informally
or voluntarily disclosed. Therefore, liberal discovery provisions
should be available to facilitate full development of the facts at the
earliest possible time. Early access to and disclosure of information
can spell the difference between justice and injustice. In any event,
there should be no mandatory requirement of informal consultation.
The determination whether to confer informally or to initiate dis-
covery in the first instance should rest with the good judgment and
sound discretion of counsel.
Once the requirement of informal consultation has been met,
each party may obtain discovery in the Tax Court only by means
of written interrogatories5 and requests for production of documents
and things.1 The rules also provide for requests for admissions
through which a party may be required to admit the truthfulness
55. The court stated:
For many years the bedrock of Tax Court practice has been the stipulation pro-
cess, now embodied in Rule 91. Essential to that process is the voluntary exchange
of necessary facts, documents, and other data between the parties as an aid to
the more expeditious trial of cases as well as for settlement purposes. The recently
adopted discovery procedures were not intended in any way to weaken the stipula-
tion process.
Id. at 692 (citation omitted).
56. 67 T.C. 89 (1976).
57. Id. at 93.
58. It is the author's experience that the office of the Regional Counsel for the IRS
schedules settlement conferences as a matter of course before initiating discovery. If the
petitioner attempts to initiate discovery before the scheduled conference date, the govern-
ment will automatically file a motion for protective order.
59. U.S.T.C. R. PRAc. & No. 71.
60. Id. R. 72.
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of any fact or application of law to the fact."1 All of these techniques,
however, may be directed only to the parties to the pending ac-
tions."* This raises one of the most significant defects in the Tax
Court rules-there is no provision for third party discovery. A peti-
tioner, as a result, cannot obtain the testimony of, or documents
from, third persons not, parties to the proceeding prior to the date
of trial.1
The rules do allow a party to obtain a copy of a statement made
by him, related to the subject matter of the case and in the posses-
sion of another party where he has no convenient means of otherwise
obtaining it." The court, however, has restricted application of this
provision to statements made directly to another party. 5 For exam-
ple, if the petitioner made a statement to a third party which is later
acquired by the respondent from that third party, it is not within
the purview of the rule since it is merely "a third party statement."6
In addition, since there is no third party discovery, there is no tech-
nique for obtaining information concerning the statement directly
from the third party.
Not only must the parties exhaust informal consultations be-
fore initiating discovery, but once they have done so, they must
comply with strict timing requirements regulating discovery proce-
dures." Since the Tax Court, in contrast to the Court of Claims and
federal district courts, has no provision for modification of its rules
through agreement of the parties, it is probable that if informal
consultation were not completed prior to these deadlines, the right
to discovery would be lost." Even if informal consultation were com-
61. Id. R. 90. It is not ground for objection that the admissions relate to opinions of law
or fact. See, e.g., Estate of William R. Allensworth v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 33 (1976)
(requiring the Commissioner to admit certain matters including statements of position con-
cerning his construction of a will). See also note 49 supra.
62. See, e.g., U.S.T.C. R. PRAc. & Po. 71(a), 72(a) & 90(a).
63. The rules do allow the issuance of subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum to compel
the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents at trial. Id. R. 147. This does
not, however, provide an opportunity to confront crucial witnesses or to examine important
documents prior to trial.
64. Id. R. 70(c).
65. Phelps v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 513 (1974).
66. Barger v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 925, 929 (1976).
67. Written interrogatories must be initiated 120 days prior to call of the case for trial.
ABA, Points to Remember, 28 TAx LAw. 409, 410 (1974). This period represents the 75 day
deadline on completion of discovery and the 45 day response period. U.S.T.C. R. PRAc. & PRo
70(c) & 71.
Similarly, requests for documents and admissions must be made 105 days prior to calen-
dar call in order to be timely. Id. R. 72 & 90.
68. The rules of practice and procedure in both the Court of Claims and the federal
district courts expressly provide for modification of discovery provisions pursuant to an agree-
ment between the parties. See notes 98 & 115 infra. While it is arguable that the parties to a
proceeding in the Tax Court could, by written agreement, modify the discovery deadlines,
the absence of express sanction portends an ominous fate for this procedure.
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pleted prior to-these cutoff dates, the combination of informal con-
sultation and deadlines makes follow up discovery difficult, if not
impossible, in the absence of a continuance. Rarely does a party
have the opportunity to use supplemental discovery in the Tax
Court after receiving the response to his initial discovery request.
Though the information embodied in the response may have devel-
oped new avenues or approaches which should be immediately ex-
plored, there will be little opportunity to do so until trial; at that
point, however, it may be too late to avoid unfair surprise.
While this dilemma could be obviated through the use of oral
depositions,"9 the rules of practice for the Tax Court do not provide
for this means of discovery.70 Such a provision, however, would give
counsel the flexibility to explore new avenues immediately as they
are developed during the deponent's oral testimony and the benefit
of personal contact for gauging the credibility of each witness. After
the depositions of several witnesses, an attorney can better foresee
the overall impact of their testimony at trial, and counsel can deter-
mine more accurately the settlement value of each case. The discov-
ery rules of the Tax Court do not provide such opportunities and,
indeed, as presently structured, do not give assurance of any per-
sonal contact, except between opposing counsel prior to trial.
This reluctance to allow depositions as a means of discovery
probably reflects the fear that discovery would become a substitute
for the stipulation procedure and that the court would become
mired in discovery proceedings.7' In light of these concerns, it is
anomalous that the court would adopt written interrogatories as a
discovery technique while precluding the use of depositions for dis-
covery. The use of written interrogatories in other forums has been
strongly criticized, and they have been the subject of more protec-
tive orders and motions to compel than any other technique.7" By
adopting discovery through the use of written interrogatories, the
Tax Court may be generating problems it sought to avoid. Cer-
tainly, if written interrogatories are to be utilized, discovery by way
of deposition, which in comparison has no significant history of
abuse, should be provided as well.73
The scope of discovery for those procedures which are available
under the rules of the Tax Court appears broad. It extends to any
69. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
70. See U.S.T.C., R. PRAc. & Po. 80(a). The note to Rule 81 states: "[Tihe primary
reason [for a deposition] must be for perpetuation of testimony and not for discovery." Id.
R. 81 n.; see Gauthier v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 245 (1974).
71. See Drennan, supra note 38, at 847.
72. See notes 28-33 and accompanying text supra.
73. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
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matter not privileged which is relevant to the subject matter in-
volved in the pending case." It is not ground for objection that the
information sought will be inadmissible at trial if the information
"appears reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible
evidence."75 Nevertheless, the requirement of informal consultation
coupled with strict cutoff dates and the absence of depositions or
other third party discovery methods effectively curtail what would
otherwise be an effective and functional scope of discovery. A party
using discovery should be able to probe into his opponent's case to
the greatest practicable extent in order to secure information con-
cerning the location and existence of evidence; in the Tax Court,
however, he is effectively precluded from doing so.
The Tax Court's application of its discovery rules has been
ambivalent and has restricted expansion of discovery to the scope
apparently allowed under the rules. Several cases, without question,
have adopted a flexible and liberal approach.7" Other cases, how-
ever, have been restrictive. For example, in P. T. & L. Construction
Co. v. Commissioner,7" the court created a qualified privilege pro-
tecting the "decisional process, i.e., the opinions and recommenda-
tions of administrative officials,"7 which effectively precludes dis-
covery of all appellate conferee reports.79 Carried to its logical ex-
74. U.S.T.C. R. Pp¢c. & PPo. 70(b).
75. Id.
76. In Pearsall v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 94, 95 (1974), the court held that the require-
ment of informal consultation does not apply to requests for admissions but only to requests
for production of documents and written interrogatories. See also note 49 supra. In Estate of
William R. Allensworth v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 33, 38 (1976), the court concluded that
admissions may be applied not only to statements of fact but also to the application of law
to facts. In Corelli v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 220, 222-23 (1976), the court granted the peti-
tioner's request for admissions with respect to the accuracy of an IRS letter ruling as well as
to the findings of fact contained therein; the court compelled production of the ruling and
related documents after concluding that no privilege was applicable. In Singleton v. Commis-
sioner, 65 T.C. 1123, 1137 (1976), the court denied the government's motion for a protective
order filed to stay discovery pending petitioner's criminal trial. The court explained that the
petitioner, whose assets had been the subject of a jeopardy assessment and who was indicted
only after his'civil tax case was already "well down the road," had a right to have his civil
case promptly decided; the right included utilization of available discovery procedures.
77. 63 T.C. 404 (1974).
78. Id. at 412.
79. In reaching this conclusion, the court accepted the reasoning but rejected the results
in Peterson v. United States, 52 F.R.D. 317 (S.D. I1. 1971), and Abel Inv. Co. v. United
States, 53 F.R.D. 485 (D. Neb. 1971), both requiring production of appellate conferee reports.
The court instead cited Simons-Eastern Co. v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Ga.
1972), and Weir Foundation v. United States, 72.1 U.S. Tax Cas. 84,520 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
holding that production was not required. See notes 120-123 and accompanying text infra.
The court's reliance on Simons-Eastern Co. was misplaced, because in that case the court
subsequently required production of the appellate conferree's report. 55 F.R.D. 88 (N.D. Ga.
1972). See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Los Alamos Constructors, 382 F.
Supp. 1373, 1381 (D.N. Mex. 1974) (emphasizing that Simons-Eastem Co. required produc-
tion of conferee's report); note 120 and accompanying text infra.
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treme, this rationale would protect the internal reports of all govern-
ment officials. Such a result strains credulity; it was certainly not
foreseen by many commentators prior to adoption of the new rules, 8
and it has not been a foreordained conclusion in other tax forums."'
In the same vein, the court has held that those portions of the
special agent's report containing his recommendations and his de-
liberations leading up to those recommendations are protected by
"executive or governmental privilege.""2 The court has indicated
that this exemption should apply where necessary to protect govern-
ment officials from embarrassment due to dissemination of certain
statements to the public. 3 The court has also been reluctant to
permit discovery of the "T-letter"' portion of the revenue agent's
report and related workpapers.15 In Barger v. Commissioner,58 the
court denied production of a revenue agent's entire report on the
ground that it was cumulative evidence already discovered. While
cumulative evidence may be excluded at trial on grounds of judicial
economy, it should be included in discovery because the scope of
discovery is broader than the scope of admissible evidence. Discov-
ery of such information should be permitted. Although the facts
may initially appear to vary only slightly from other information
already revealed, they may on detailed examination contain refine-
ments leading to or disclosing previously unknown evidence. By
precluding discovery on the ground that the information sought is
cumulative of other evidence already discovered, the court creates
Similarly, in Weir Foundation production was withheld but on the grounds of work
product, a result expressly rejected by the court in its P. T. & L. Constr. Co. decision. See
also Murray, Tax Court Discovery: The Need for Restraint, 53 TAXEs 327, 334 (1975) (discuss-
ing this distinction). In effect, the court withheld production without any analogous authority
to support its decision.
80. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 2, at 1368. The author suggests that if requests for
production of documents could reach internal government memoranda, it would be "a tre-
mendous boon to the taxpayer in his quest to learn the underlying theories the Government
has used in its determination of the taxpayer's deficiency." Id.
81. Many district court cases have required production of appellate conferee reports. See,
e.g., Simons-Eastern Co. v. United States, 55 F.R.D. 88 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Abel Inv. Co. v.
United States, 53 F.R.D. 485 (D. Neb. 1971); Peterson v. United States, 52 F.R.D. 317 (S.D.
Ill. 1971). The Court of Claims has cited the Abel and Peterson cases in also requiring
production. See Cetron Elec. Corp., 208 Ct. Cl. 985, 992 (1975).
82. P.T. & L. Constr. Co., 63 T.C. at 411.
83. Id. at 410-12.
84. A transmittal letter is a summary report which is not given to the taxpayer. It
includes confidential, informant and third party information as well as the agent's appraisal
of the taxpayer. See Branerton Corp. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 191, 195 (1975).
85. In Branerton Corp., the court, concluding that discovery of the T-letter was war-
ranted, emphasized the heavy burden placed on the petitioner to show that the adjustment
by the respondent of the petitioner's reserve for bad debts constituted an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 200-01.
86. 65 T.C. 925, 931 (1975).
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one of the very difficulties it eschewed in adopting restrictive discov-
ery. It becomes "mired in discovery proceedings,""7 and in effect
must review in camera all information sought to be discovered to
determine whether it is cumulative. 8
B. Discovery in the Court of Claims
Discovery in the Court of Claims is broader both in terms of
availability and scope than in the Tax Court." In the Court of
Claims, there is no requirement that the parties confer informally
prior to initiating discovery. Instead, discovery may be initiated
immediately after the filing of an answer or other responsive plead-
ing to the petition. 0 Provision for early initiation of discovery optim-
izes the time of counsel for both sides, obviating the requirement of
attending conferences designed solely for the informal exchange or
stipulation of information.
Furthermore, the Court of Claims provides for methods of dis-
covery unavailable in the Tax Court."1 These include the use of third
party discovery. Under the rules of practice of the Court of Claims,
depositions both on oral examination and written questions may be
taken of any person, parties or third parties." In addition, since
subpoenas duces tecum directed to third parties may be used in
connection with the taking of all depositions, the production of doc-
uments far in advance of trial may be effectively compelled from
those third persons."
Discovery may also be obtained by "calls," a method unique to
the Court of Claims which consists of calling upon and requiring
87. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
88. The court has created a special exception precluding discovery of statements of either
the petitioner or third party witnesses which are to be used primarily for impeachment
purposes. See, e.g., Barger, 65 T.C. at 929-30. But see Industrial Elec. Sales & Serv., Inc. v.
Commissionef, 65 T.C. 844 (1976) (ordered government to produce witnesses' statements
allegedly to be used for impeachment purposes but delayed production until petitioner re-
sponded to government's request for admissions).
89. See note 7 supra (differences in discovery procedures between forums provide a basis
for forum-shopping). See generally Evans, Current Procedures of Court of Claims, 55 Gpo.
L.J. 422, 428 (1966) (discussing discovery in the Court of Claims); see also Carrington,
Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the
National Law, 82 HARv. L. Rzv. 542, 609 (1969) (describing the Court of Claims' role in tax
litigation as "an anachronism, which serves today only to provide an opportunity for forum-
shopping"); Miller, Tax Litigation in the Court of Claims, 55 GEo. L.J. 454, 454 (1966)
(emphasizing that tax refund suits represent the single largest category of litigation in the
Court of Claims).
90. CT. CL. R. 71(c).
91. See id. R. 71(a) (providing a general summary of available discovery methods).
92. Id. R. 84 (providing for depositions on oral examination with leave of court); id. R.
85 (providing for depositions on written question with leave of court).
93. Id. R. 82.
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production of information or papers from a department or agency
of the United States government.' Moreover, as in the Tax Court,
discovery, directed only to parties, may be obtained by means of
written interrogatories," requests for production of documents and
things," and admissions. 7 While discovery, with the exception of
written interrogatories, may only be obtained by leave of the court,
the parties have authority to modify the procedures under the rules
by written stipulation so as to permit other methods of discovery."
Opinions of the Court of Claims regarding its discovery proce-
dures are published only on rare occasions." However, in contrast
with the somewhat ambivalent approach of the Tax Court, the
Court of Claims has been "relatively liberal in granting discovery
motions.' 00 For instance, in Centron Electric Corp.,'01 the plaintiff
sought production of internal reports of IRS officials. The govern-
ment's principal contention was that the documents were protected
by governmental privilege. In rejecting this claim, the court pointed
out there is "a general public policy for production of evidence
needed in the search for truth. In the adversary system of establish-
ing truth by litigation, this is very important, for such a system
required development of all relevant facts to produce real justice
through due process.""' In ordering production, the court relied
primarily on two district court cases' °3 for what it considered "the
weight of modern authority.""' The court viewed these cases, which
required production of appellate conferee reports, as holding that
the mere presence of government "opinions, conclusions and recom-
mendations . . . is no protection against discovery""' when relev-
ance and genuine need are shown.
In Shakespeare Co. v. United States, '"8 the Court of Claims held
that IRS private and letter rulings issued to third party taxpayers
need not be produced. This position, also taken by the Tax Court,0 7
94. Id. R. 75. See also, Evans, supra note 89, at 429.
95. CT. CL. R. 73.
96. Id. R. 74.
97. Id. R. 72.
98. Id. R. 71(d).
99. See Miller, supra note 89, at 466.
100. Id. The scope of discovery'available in the Court of Claims is quite broad. See, e.g.,
Farm & Home Aluminium Prods., Inc. v. United States, 211 Ct. Cl. 291 (1976).
101. 207 Ct. Cl. 985 (1975).
102. Id. at 989.
103. See Abel Inv. Co. v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 485 (D. Neb. 1971); Peterson v. United
States, 52 F.R.D. 317 (S.D. Ill 1971). See also notes 120-23 and accompanying text infra.
104. 207 Ct. Cl. at 992.
105. Id.
106. 389 F.2d 772, 778 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
107. See Davis v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1014, 1022 (1976); Teichgraeber v. Commis-
sioner, 64 T.C. 453, 456 (1975).
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has been rejected through congressional adoption of 26 U.S.C. §
6110.108 This statute, providing for public inspection of IRS private
rulings and other determinations, represents a public policy favor-
ing increased disclosure by the IRS concerning its advice to taxpay-
ers about the tax treatment of their contemplated transactions. In-
creased discovery under the Tax Court rules would also further this
policy objective.
C. Discovery in the Federal District Courts
Discovery in federal district courts is broader than that avail-
able in either the Tax Court or the Court of Claims. There is no
requirement of informal consultation in the district courts. Instead,
the general rule is that discovery may be obtained from the plaintiff
after his filing of the complaint and from any other party after
service of the summons and complaint on that party. 109
The discovery techniques available in the district courts allow
counsel to avoid unfair surprise. These methods include the use of
depositions on both oral examination"0 and written questions."' As
in the Court of Claims, these depositons may be directed to both
parties and third parties. In addition, the use of subpoenas in
connection with depositions provides a means of obtaining the dis-
covery of documents from third parties."' As in the Tax Court,
discovery is supplemented by requests for production of documents
and things,"' and admissions," ' all of which may be directed only
to parties. Leave of the court generally is not required in order to
employ any of these available means of discovery. Moreover, in line
with the Court of Claims but in contrast to the Tax Court, the
district courts give the parties additional discretion and flexibility
to modify the available discovery procedures by written stipula-
tion."5 In addition, the district courts have no specific rule requiring
completion of discovery by a certain deadline prior to trial. This is
established by local rule.
The district court rules serve as a model for maximizing discov-
ery prior to trial. By not requiring informal consultation, by provid-
108. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6110 (West Supp. 1978).
109. See Fum. R. Crv. P. 26, 31, 33, 34 & 36. With respect to depositions on oral examina-
tion, however, leave of the court is required if the plaintiff seeks to take a deposition within
30 days of service of summons, unless the defendent has initiated discovery or is about to go
beyond a 100 mile radius of the district. Fw. R. Civ. P. 30(a) & (b)(2).
110. Id. R. 30.
111. Id. R. 31.
112. Id. R. 45(b).
113. Id. R. 34.
114. Id. R. 36.
115. Id. R. 29.
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ing for all traditional means of discovery without leave of the court
and by not requiring completion of discovery by a certain fixed date
prior to trial, the federal district courts tend to minimize the pros-
pect of unfair surprise. The effect is a virtual rejection of the
"sporting theory of justice."
The scope of allowable discovery under the rules of the district
courts is basically identical, insofar as linguistic content is con-
cerned, to that in the Tax Court and the Court of Claims."' Despite
the apparent coextensive scope of discovery under the respective
rules, decisions by the district courts in connection with tax matters
have tended to be much more flexible in authorizing discovery than
have those of the Tax Court."7 Although the IRS "holds the track
record as the most reluctant bureaucratic dragon in its claims of
confidentiality," it has, in the district courts, suffered an "almost
unbroken string of losses . . . in its unrelenting defiance of the
requirements of disclosure."" 8
In Simons-Eastern Co. v. United States,"' the government was
ordered to produce several documents from its files on the company
seeking repayment of tax overcharges. The IRS had contended that
documents such as the intra-agency reports of the various agents
investigating the taxpayer were the work product of the government
created in anticipation of litigation. Therefore, the information con-
tained within the documents was privileged because it consisted of
opinions and legal conclusions of the agents rather than objective
facts. The court reviewed the files, balanced the interests of the
parties and ordered disclosure of the relevant factual material but
specifically exempted any documents relaying conclusions and
opinions of the agents.
In Peterson v. United States, 120 the district court was even more
liberal in opening IRS files to the taxpayer. There, the court con-
strued the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
116. See, e.g., notes 74 & 91 supra. See also, CT. CL. R. 71(b)(1).
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "parties may obtain discovery of any matter,
not privileged, which is related to the subject matter of the pending action. It is not ground
for objection that the information will be inadmissible at trial if the information sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence." FED. R. Cw. P.
26(b)(1).
117. See, e.g., Equal Protection Opportunity Comm'n v. Los Alamos Constructors, Inc.,
382 F. Supp. 1373 (D.N. Mex. 1974).
118. Id: at 1376, 1379. In Center on Corporate Responsibility, Inc. v. Schultz, 368 F.
Supp. 863 (D.D.C. 1973), the IRS failed to comply with the court's discovery orders, claiming
that executive privilege barred discovery of information located in the White House. Because
the IRS hindered and delayed discovery, the plaintiff's claim was deemed established without
the proof discovery might have yielded. Id. at 873.
119. 55 F.R.D. 88 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
120. 52 F.R.D. 317 (S.D. Il1. 1971).
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dure as encouraging the free discovery of all relevant material so
long as it was not prepared in anticipation of litigation. Since few
cases result in litigation, the court presumed the file was not privi-
leged. The government was given the burden of establishing that a
file was trial material rather than material gathered for information
and assessment.
Abel Investment Co. v. United States' was similar to Peter-
son in both facts and result. The taxpayer sought discovery of the
revenue agent's report along with all schedules and exhibits, work-
sheets used in preparing the report, notes of conversations held
between the revenue agent and others in the course of preparing
the report, and the appellate conferee's report. Again, the IRS
attempted to prevent discovery on grounds of work product and
governmental privilege. The district court rejected the work pro-
duct contention,'22 emphasizing that to conclude otherwise
would indeed put the government in a position markedly advan-
tageous to that of a private litigant. I think that any government
agency whose determinations might lead to litigation could show
the same continuity, as all serve the same master; but to hold
that any intra-agency or inter-agency report which eventually
could be relayed to the attorney who must try the case for the
government is a report or document prepared in anticipation of
litigation would be effectively to shield all government reports.
This is, I think, clearly contrary to the intent of Rule 26.123
The court found that the public policy argument of governmental
privilege was undercut by the government's own affidavits, which
established that the requested documents contained nothing which
would prove unduly embarrassing. As a result, it allowed discovery.
VI. PROPOSALS FOR REFORMING THE RULES OF DIScOvERY IN THE TAX
COURT
Both the Court of Claims and the federal district courts provide
121. 53 F.R.D. 485 (D. Neb. 1971).
122. The district court identified several factors establishing that the requested docu-
ments were not work product prepared in anticipation of litigation. First, the reports were
routinely prepared in each case and before filing of any lawsuit. Second, they were not
prepared by or at the direction of an attorney who would try the case should litigation
develop. Third, since the reports were impartial as between the taxpayer and the government,
they were not designed to be adversarial in nature. Fourth, the documents probably did not
fix the government's theory of the case to be used at trial, because trial counsel should and
undoubtedly would set the defense from all available facts and theories whether or not
conceived and expressed by personnel at the various stages of the settlement process. Fifth,
the reports were not the result of the government's own investigative work but rather of
evidence submitted by both the taxpayer and the government. Id. at 489.
123. Id. at 490.
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a more liberal and pragmatic approach to discovery than does the
Tax Court."4 Neither requires informal consultation prior to the use
of discovery, and the federal district courts, in contrast to the Tax
Court, do not provide a stringent cutoff deadline curtailing the use
of discovery.' In addition, the district courts and the Court of
Claims provide for third party discovery through the use of deposi-
tions which, when used in conjunction with subpoenas duces tecum,
effectively require the production of documents from third parties.
Since the depositions may be oral, as well as on written questions,
maximum flexibility is afforded through direct personal contact to
gauge the credibility of witnesses and to develop further factual
discovery. The Court of Claims and the federal district courts ap-
pear to have been more liberal in the construction of their respective
rules "'26 than has the Tax Court.
Some commentators have urged that discovery in the Tax
Court should not be expanded, since to do so would benefit the
government more than the taxpayer.2 7 Some of these commentators
were opposed to even the limited discovery provisions implemented
by the Tax Court.'28 They argue.that since the taxpayer typically
has control of the facts and may reveal them as strategy dictates,
to implement discovery would simply provide the government with
a means of getting at these facts and could lead to governmental
abuse and harassment. 29
Other commentators, however, find this a shortsighted view-
point.'3 Through the use of its summons power, the government
already has a means of obtaining disclosure of virtually any infor-
mation.' 3' This flexible power, which is subject to neither consulta-
tion requirements nor specific cutoff dates, gives the government
authority to obtain oral testimony of any party or third party wit-
nesses' 32 and disclosure of documents in the hands of third parties.
124. See Dep't of Justice Study, supra note 7, at 105-06.
125. See note 67 and accompanying text supra (discussion of deadlines in the Tax
Court). The Court of Claims does have an analogous but less stringent rule; after the schedul-
ing of trial, no measure of discovery may be commenced without leave of the court for good
cause shown. CT. CL. R. 71(c).
126. See Jones, supra note 2, at 377.
127. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 6, at 340; Proposed Rules, supra note 46, at 387-89
(remarks of Lester M. Ponder).
128. See Proposed Rules, supra note 46, at 387.
129. See Cohen, supra note 6, at 340-41.
130. See, e.g., Dep't of Justice Study, supra note 7, at 109-10; Comment, supra note 2,
at 1362 passim.
131. See note 9 supra.
132. It has been held that use of the summons power is available to the government even
though the taxpayer's case is pending before the Tax Court. See, e.g., National Plate &
Window Glass Co. v. United States, 254 F.2d 92, 93 (2d Cir. 1958); In re Norda Essential Oil
& Chem. Co. v. United States, 253 F.2d 700, 701 (2d Cir. 1958).
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A taxpayer who brings suit in the Tax Court has none of these
means for compelling disclosure of information.1m
The effect is to discriminate against those taxpayers who are
relegated to suit in the Tax Court by virtue of their monetary situa-
tion. A taxpayer in this position is twice discriminated against. He
is unable to take advantage of the broader discovery provisions in
the Court of Claims and district courts, methods available to those
who can pay the tax in advance, and he is unable to utilize methods
of disclosure available to his opponent, the government. One of the
aims of discovery is to correct the imbalance between the investiga-
tory resources of large and small litigants.' This imbalance remains
uncorrected in the Tax Court.
Discovery, through oral depositons or third party discovery,
would provide substantial assistance to the taxpayer faced with
litigation where the government plans to call as a witness the reve-
nue officer who investigated the underlying facts concerning an as-
sertion of transferee liabilitys or the special agent who performed
the same function concerning an assertion of fraud penalty. Written
interrogatories are of little assistance in these typically recurring
fact situations. Responses are often couched in evasive terms, and
there is little opportunity for followup under the strict timing re-
quirements of the Tax Court."' Present Tax Court rules provide no
opportunity for a face to face meeting with either of these govern-
ment witnesses prior to trial. Oral depostions would provide both an
opportunity for judging the credibility of the witnesses and a means
for developing and exploring new facts prior to trial.
Taxpayer litigants in the Tax Court are placed at a severe
disadvantage at trial where pretrial discovery of third party govern-
ment witnesses is not available. Consider, for example, the need to
obtain discovery concerning hostile minority shareholders who are
prepared to testify for the government in an estate tax case regard-
ing decedent's exercise of effective control," 7 or third party govern-
133. A taxpayer in the Tax Court has no assurance that his counsel has been able to
contact personally the government's witnesses prior to trial. See note 70 and accompanying
text supra. A taxpayer is unable even to obtain copies of his own statements made to third
parties which have come into the hands of the government. See notes 65-66 and accompany-
ing text supra.
134. See notes 21-23 and accompanying text supra.
135. See, e.g., Newsome v. Commissioner, 35 T.CM. (CCH) 335, 337 (1976) (revenue
officer testified as to insolvency of the transferor and the fact "that there were no prospects
for future development, production or sales"). See generally Newton, Collection of Federal
Taxes by Transferee Liability: How it Works; Who Can be Caught, 43 J. TAX. 112, 113-14
(1975) (discussing substantive requirements of transferee liability).
136. See L. PoNDER, UNrMED STATES TAX Counrr PRAcncu AND PRocEDuRE 105-06 (1976)
(discussing strict timing requirements for discovery in Tax Court).




ment witnesses who are prepared to testify where the taxpayer is
alleged to have failed to report income. 3 '
When considering the effects of the expansion of discovery in
Tax Court proceedings, attention should not be directed to who
benefits the most, the government or the taxpayer, but rather to the
promotion of justice and fairness in Tax Court litigation. The Tax
Court should reject the "sporting theory of justice." Victory in the
Tax Court should be won on the merits based on all the facts;
surprise should play no part in that process.
In the past, the Tax Court has not been in a position to gauge
the effectiveness of discovery due to the nature of its procedures. As
pointed out in a recent letter from Chief Judge Featherston, "the
discovery papers with the exception of requests for admissions (if
such requests are regarded as discovery) are not filed with the Court
unless a dispute arises between parties. For that reason, the Court
is not fully aware of the extent of the use of the discovery proce-
dures."'"' As a result, the court of necessity has "depended heavily
upon reports from the Bar as to the effectiveness and fairness of the
operation of [its] Rules.""" In this connection, the Tax Court has
taken the initiative. At the court's request, The Tax Lawyer re-
cently initiated a survey of tax practitioners exploring areas where
alterations and improvement of the rules of practice and procedure
of the court might be appropriate."' The results of the Tax Court
Rules Experience Survey, released in a Report of the Committee on
Court Procedure of the American Bar Association Section on Taxa-
tion, dated May 6, 1977, reflect a growing realization of the need and
increasing demand for additional discovery in the Tax Court.",
A significant majority of the survey respondents agreed that
discovery procedures facilitated both the preparation of stipulation
facts and the settlement of a case through disposition without
trial."' The responding practitioners not only believed that the new
discovery procedures had not been abused"' but also indicated that
the benefits of discovery far outweighed any possible burdens or
138. See, e.g., Branerton Corp. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 191 (1975). But see Weimer-
skirsch v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 672 (1977) (government's failure to disclose identity of
informers does not deprive petitioner of fair trial); Davis v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1014
(1976).
139. Letter from Chief Judge Featherston of the United States Tax Court, Washington,
D.C., to William H. Newton m (Dec. 8, 1977) (on file at University of Miami Law Review).
140. Id.
141. 30 TAx LAw. 545 (1977).
142. See appendices A, B & C infra. The survey was provided by Chief Judge Featherston
pursuant to his letter of December 8, 1977. See note 139 supra. Only that portion of the survey
which directly relates to discovery is included.
143. Appendix B, question 3b infra.
144. Id. question 4a.
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misuses.'45 The general conclusion regarding judicial involvement in
effectuating use of discovery procedures was that intervention of the
court was, at most, only occasionally required.'
The survey indicated a decided preference for continued expan-
sion of the existing discovery tools. For example, depositions for
discovery purposes were favored by a majority of about two to one.4 7
Approximately the same number approved of discovery directed at
third parties.' Even those opposing the use of discovery as to third
parties would authorize use of interrogatories or depositions as to
experts in valuation cases.'
In addition, despite the assertion that expanded discovery
would not benefit the taxpayer to any great extent, the survey em-
phasized that practitioners from both sides of the Tax Court pro-
ceedings have concluded that expansion of discovery "would permit
better trial preparation and facilitate settlement by enabling both
parties to develop all relevant facts before trial and evaluate the
credibility of their own and their adversaries' witness."'5
Practitioners from the taxpayers' side view discovery as a
means of attaining parity, of achieving the same degree of access to
information already available to the government through its investi-
gative and summons powers. 5' After fifty years without discovery,
the Tax Court has been cautious in implementing discovery proce-
dures. The survey establishes that the court's concerns that discov-
ery would become a substitute for the stipulation procedure and
that the court would become mired in proceedings to enforce and
administer discovery have not materialized.
The survey concludes that rather than becoming a substitute
for the stipulation procedure, discovery has actually facilitated it
and, in addition, has promoted disposition of cases without the need
for trial. In effect, it appears that discovery has made it easier for
the parties to reach a basis of settlement and, where trial is neces-
sary, has facilitated preparation of the stipulation by making it
easier to get at the facts. Discovery provides a fair means of obtain-
ing evidence which might otherwise never be produced, or the pro-
duction of which could otherwise be delayed to obtain unfair advan-
tage. Increasing present discovery methods in the Tax Court will
further enhance the stipulation process and decrease unfair pretrial
and trial tactics.
145. Id. question 4b.
146. Id. question 4a.
147. Id. question 6a.
148. Id.
149. Id. question 6b.
150. Appendix C infra, at p. 643.
151. Id. See also note 134 and accompanying text supra.
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Nor is there any indication that the court's concern that it
would become mired in proceedings to administer and enforce dis-
covery has materialized.'52 On the contrary, the survey indicates
that the court's involvement or intervention into the discovery pro-
cedures was at most only occasionally required. '53 In fact, in addi-
tion to providing justice and fairness between litigants, discovery
has actually promoted judicial economy within the court by encour-
aging settlements, by facilitating stipulation preparation and by
minimizing trial time. Since there has been an absence of abuse and
neither of the reasons of the Tax Court for restricting discovery has
materialized, a more liberal approach to discovery, like those in the
Court of Claims and district courts, is now warranted.
Specifically, it is recommended that the Tax Court eliminate
the requirement of informal consultation prior to the use of discov-
ery. Rather than discovery being subordinated to the stipulation
procedure, both should be placed on a parity, complementing each
other. To effectuate this result, all forms of discovery should be
immediately available for use after the respondent has filed its an-
swer. In addition, discovery should continue to be available as close
as practicable up to the date of trial. 5' Similarly, the period of time
for responding to interrogatories should be reduced from forty-five
to thirty days, as it is in the Court of Claims and the federal district
courts.'55
The Tax Court rules should also provide for third party discov-
ery by way of oral deposition and depositions on written questions,
both without leave of the court. Oral depositions, in contrast to
written interrogatories, have special value in that they provide max-
imum flexibility to explore immediately new avenues of discovery
and to judge the credibility of each witness. When coupled with
subpoenas duces tecum, depositions provide an effective means of
obtaining the production of documents from third party witnesses.
It is suggested that the use of depositions should be allowed up to
thirty days prior to the trial date.
Moreover, serious consideration should be given to allowing
additional discovery provisions beyond the scope of the Rules of
Practice of the Court of Claims and the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. A number of survey repondents favored the use of depositions
152. See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
153. Appendix B, question 4c infra.
154. The present 120 day cutoff point for interrogatories and 90 day deadlines for re-
quests for documents and admissions are too restrictive. These time limits appear in U.S.T.C.
R. PpAc. & Po. 70(a)(2), 71(c), 72(b) & 90. A more realistic alternative would be to allow all
forms of discovery up to 45 days prior to trial.
155. See U.S.T.C. R. PRAc. & No. 71(c) & 72(b); CT. CL. R. 72(d) & 73(b); FED. R. Cw.
P. 33(a), 36(a) & 34(b).
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as to experts. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do provide this
option but only with leave of the court. "' In addition, a number of
cases in the district courts have held that expert reports are not
discoverable. "' A significant number of cases tried in Tax Court
involve valuation issues where expert testimony is required. "' These
cases, which only involve issues of ultimate fact, such as the valua-
tion of certain properties, would typically be settled if the expert
testimony and valuation reports were required to be disclosed be-
forehand. Expanded discovery with respect to expert testimony and
reports would further restrict the impact of the "sporting theory of
justice" in those cases that proceed to trial.
One of the arguments advanced for not further expanding dis-
covery is the possibility of abuse and harassment by the govern-
ment. 5' If this prospect is deemed sufficiently realistic, however,
remedies are available. For example, all discovery by the govern-
ment, in contrast to that by the taxpayer, could be made subject to
court approval upon a showing by the government of substantial
necessity. Provision could be made for assessing costs and attorney's
fees against the government, if it were demonstrated that the gov-
ernment acted vexatiously or in bad faith for the purpose of harass-
ment through its use of discovery.' 0 This provision could be applied
regardless of the outcome of the litigation. Alternatively, rules
could be adopted for an offer of judgment, a procedure in which a
formal offer of settlement is made through the court.'' If the offer
is accepted, the case is concluded, but if the offer is rejected and
the deficiency, if any, as subsequently determined by the court, is
within the limits of the earlier settlement proposal, all costs subse-
quent to the offer are taxed to the party rejecting it. Adoption of
these proposals would effectively prevent abuse or harassment by
the government.
156. Fan. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
157. See, e.g., United States v. 145.31 Acres of Land, 54 F.R.D. 359 (M.D. Pa. 1972);
Smith v. Central Linen Serv. Co., 39 F.R.D. 15 (D. Md. 1966).
158. Estate and gift tax cases typically involve valuation issues. See I.R.C. §§ 2031, 2512.
159. See Cohen, supra note 6, at 340-41.
160. A similar provison, included in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West Supp. 1974-77), provides:
[fin any civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of
America, to enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United States
Internal Revenue code. . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
Courts have not agreed on whether, in order for fees to be awarded, the taxpayer must
be the defendant in the action and must show vexatious or harassing treatment by the
government. Compare Lieb v. United States, 77.2 U.S. Tax Cas. 88,560 (E.D. Okla. 1977)
(denying attorney's fees because taxpayer brought suit and did not show bad faith harass-
ment by the government) with Levno v. United States, 77-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 88,329 (D. Mont.
1977) (awarding attorney's fees to plaintiff taxpayer without finding of harassment).




The Tax Court should immediately begin to expand the scope
of discovery under its rules of practice and procedure. Since the
scope of discovery is much broader in the Court of Claims and in
the district courts, expansion of discovery is warranted in the Tax
Court to avoid discrimination against those taxpayers who choose
or are forced to litigate in that court. This need is especially urgent
since discovery methods which the taxpayer is unable to utilize in
Tax Court are available to the government through the use of its
summons powers.
Until now, the Tax Court has not been in a position to deter-
mine the effectiveness of its rules. The recent survey of tax practi-
tioners, however, establishes that the court's initial concerns in re-
stricting the scope of discovery have not proved valid. Therefore, in
order to avoid discrimination, to eliminate the "sporting theory of
justice" and to promote fairness in Tax Court proceedings, further
expansion of the discovery rules of the court is essential.
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APPENDIX A
Report of the Committee on Court Procedure*
Tax Court Rules Experience Survey
In response to announcement by the United States Tax Court
that its Rules Committee was undertaking review of the Court's
Rules of Practice and Procedure which became effective on Jan-
uary 1, 1974, the Committee on Court Procedure of the Section
of Taxation of the American Bar Association prepared a Tax
Court Rules Experience Survey which was published at 30 Tax
Lawyer 545 (Winter 1977).
The Survey was presented in a form intended to elicit re-
sponses regarding those aspects of the Rules which invoked the
most discussion at the time of their adoption, the general impact
of the Rules upon the conduct of proceedings in the Tax Court,
and to afford respondents the opportunity to express views on
other aspects of the Rules not specifically dealt with by the vari-
ous Survey questions.
In the belief that the comments with the greatest value to
the Court would be those of practitioners actually appearing be-
fore the Court in proceedings governed by the Rules, the Survey
required respondents to indicate that they had appeared as coun-
sel in cases governed by the Rules. Moreover, responses have been
compared to counsel of record listings in the Tix Court docket
published commercially to verify that respondents possessed the
requisite experience.
The experience limitation obviously limited the number of
subscribers to The Tax Lawyer who were eligible to respond.
Responses were received from both counsel for petitioners and
counsel for respondent.
As of the date of this Report, 29 qualified responses have
been received which commented in substantially all respects on
the Survey questions. In addition, several other responses have
been received from practitioners with requisite appearances, but
* ABA, Section on Taxation, Comm. on Court Procedure (May 6,
1977) (report submitted by Chairman Steven C. Salch).
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who indicated they did not believe it would be appropriate that
they comment since the cases in which they were involved were
dipsosed of without trial and the necessity of employment of
discovery procedures or the completion of the stipulation process
in preparation for trial.
It is deemed inappropriate for the Committee to endeavor
to draw inferences or conclusions from the Survey responses.
The Committee believes it to be more appropriate to let the re-
sponses speak for themselves and accordingly, to submit its Re-
port in the form of a tabulation of Survey responses and sum-
mary of individual responses to Question 10 of this Survey.
This form of submission will enable the Court and the bar
as a whole to draw their own inferences and conclusions from
the Survey responses.
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APPENDIX B
Tax Court Rules Experience Survey*
1. Since January 1, 1974 (the effective date of the new Tax
Court Rules of Practice and Procedure (the "Rules")) I have
appeared as counsel in proceedings before the Tax Court (includ-
ing cases pending on January 1, 1974) in:
1 case 3
2-5 cases 12
More than 5 cases 14
NOTE:
This is an experience survey. Comments and suggestions from
all members of the Section regarding the Rules are always wel-
come, but it is not the purpose of this particular survey to solicit
responses from those who have not actually practiced under the
new Rules.
3a. Which of the following discovery or admissions proced-
ures made available by the Rules have you utilized?
Written interrogatories 10
Request for documents 10
Request for* admissions 10
None of the above 10
No answer 2




of facts No 2 Yes 13
Facilitated disposition
of the case without
trial No 2 Yes 8
No answer 13
The questionnaire was published in 30 TAx LAW. 545 (1977).
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4a. Do you believe the Tax Court's new discovery procedures




4b. On the whole do you believe that abuses of the discovery
procedures outweigh the benefits and that the Court should dis-
continue these procedures in the future? (If your answer is No,
specify comments as to the benefits which you see in the dis-




4c. Did you or respondent find it necessary to seek the in-











6a. Should the Rule provide for application of discovery




6b. If your answer to the preceding question was No, would
your answer be different if third party discovery was limited
to interrogatories or depositions of experts in valuation cases?
19791




10. Briefly identify or describe problem areas or suggestions




Tabulation of Responses to Tax Court Rules
Experience Survey
Summary of Comments in Response to Question 10
III. Discovery. As might be expected a substantial portion
of the comments dwelt upon various aspects of the discovery pro-
cedures in the Rules.
Scope of Discovery.
A number of comments advocate expansion of the dis-
covery procedures to include, upon leave of the Court,
depositions and to expand discovery to third parties. Third-
party discovery is advocated from commentators on both
sides of Tax Court proceedings on the basis that it would
permit better trial preparation and facilitate settlement
by enabling both parties to develop all relevant 'facts be-
fore trial and evaluate the credibility of their own and
their adversaries' witnesses. Practitioners on petitioners'
side also see third-party discovery as a means of attaining
the same access available to respondent through respon-
dent's investigative and summons powers. It is suggested
that third-party discovery is particularly valuable in valu-
ation cases and in whipsaw situations in which only one
of the affected taxpayers is before the Tax Court.
Foreign Depositions.
Two respondents commented unfavorably as to their ex-
perience under the portion of the Rules dealing with deposi-
tions abroad. The view was expressed that the Rules were
archaic in this respect and should be conformed to what
can practically be done and that the paucity of use of these
procedures occasioned some difficulty in obtaining correct
orders and authentication of the commission.
Procedures: Time Limits.
The view was expressed that hearings on motions for
discovery should be expedited.
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Several responses suggested that the point of cutoff
of discovery should be moved to either 50 days prior to
the time the case is set for call on a calendar or to the
date of call from a calendar. It was noted that the 120-day
Trial Status Report transmission coupled with the 45-day
objection period in Rule 71(c) and the 30-day response
periods in Rules 72(b) and 90(c) coupled with the 90-
day notice of calendaring could operate to cut off dis-
covery and reward a dilatory party while leaving the
parties to motions to compel stipulation as the only means
of limiting factual issues to the facts reasonably in dispute.
Sanctions.
One respondent suggested that sanctions be called for
in cases of "harassment" discovering citing as examples
thereof requests for admissions served on the Commis-
sioner which go to the theory of the case and interrogatories
served by a petitioner relative to facts purely within the
petitionpr's knowledge.
IV. Stipulations.
Respondents suggested that the limitation on filing motions
to compel stipulations be relaxed to permit such motions to be
filed at any time prior to call of the case from a trial calendar
and that the Rule 91 (f) (3) hearing be held in conjunction with
a pretrial conference under Rule 110.
It was also suggested that the Court should be more stringent
in granting motions to compel stipulations.
V. Pretrial Procedures.
It was suggested that it would be helpful if the Court would
call for more pretrial conferences sua sponte.
It was also suggested that the Rules provide for the filing
of pretrial submissions in all cases other than "S" cases in a
manner similar to that obtaining under the practice of the Court
of Claims and of various United States district courts.
It was further suggested that the Rules spell out the purpose
and usage of the Request for Trial Status Report.
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